The task the Gonzaga Law Review editors assigned me was “to submit a piece on why tort reform was needed in Washington, and why this Act satisfied that need.” Completion of such an as- signment is, of course, impossible. To identify a need and analyze its resolution requires agreement on the exact components creating the need. Without agreement concerning these components, it will be unclear whether each element of the need has been fulfilled.
The precise need for tort reform is incapable of being distin- guished because the idea is heterogeneous, not homogeneous. Per- sons view each component of the problem separately and from their own perspective. They then determine a need exists based upon an opinion reached from that perspective, and thereafter broadcast this determination as an unbiased, informed conclusion. Alexander Pope, in his essay on criticism, very succinctly ad- dressed the hazards of such conclusions, stating: “Tis with our judgements, as our watches, none go just alike, yet each believes his own.”‘ With that caveat, I present my views on why tort reform was called for. I do so with a firm belief in my opinion. . .